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Abstract 
 
Why did Japan deploy ballistic missile defense when and how it did? The prevailing view 
characterizes Japan’s BMD decision as a response to North Korea’s 1998 Taepodong missile 
launch. But “Ballistic Missile Defense in Japan: Process-Tracing a Historical Trajectory” 
contests this simple assumption of causation. The thesis first pieces together a more 
comprehensive historical narrative from contemporary sources and interviews with formal 
officials. Analysis of this newly revised timeline then demonstrates that focusing events like the 
Taepodong incident were but one of several factors driving BMD; others included alliance 
pressures, bureaucratic leadership, and defense industry profitability. These findings are more 
important now than ever as the United States pivots towards Asia and transitions to relying on 
Japan as an equal military partner. Understanding the history of missile defense in Japan leads to 
the heart of how and why the United States’ close ally makes its national security decisions, and 
thus allows both parties to forge a better alliance. 
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Introduction 
 
Shortly after noon on August 31, 1998, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) – otherwise known as North Korea – test-fired a two-stage Taepodong-1 missile over 
the Japanese mainland. The first-stage booster rocket fell into the Sea of Japan, while the rest of 
the missile overflew the northern part of Honshu and fell 300 miles east of the island into the 
Pacific Ocean.1 Japanese reaction, which has since been called “Taepodong shock,” came swift 
and fierce. Senior officials immediately denounced North Korea’s intrusion of Japanese 
sovereign air space as “a very dangerous act” that would “have a serious impact on the security 
of Northeast Asia.”2 The Government of Japan withdrew its funds from the Korean Peninsula 
Energy Development Organization (KEDO), an initiative established to help North Korea build 
two light-water nuclear power reactors in exchange for Pyongyang’s promise to end its nuclear 
weapons program.3 It stopped all food and humanitarian assistance to North Korea, and froze 
talks to normalize relations with the country. But most importantly for the purposes of this 
analysis, it led the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) to suggest that North Korea, in highlighting 
Japan’s vulnerability to attack, would push the Japanese government further into talks with 
collaborating on the United States on a missile defense program. 4 Less than one year later, on 
August 16, 1999, the United States and Japan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
establishing that the two countries would pursue joint research of the nosecone, seeker, kinetic 
warhead, and second-stage rocket motor of the SM-3 BlockIIA interceptor missile. 5 
 
The timing of these events has led to the general presumption that North Korea’s 1998 
Taepodong missile launch over the Japanese archipelago truly began Tokyo’s engagement with 
the United States on ballistic missile defense (BMD). That is to say, the prevailing view is that, 
although discussions between the United States and Japan had begun over a decade before the 
Taepodong launch, it was this particular focusing event that cemented Japan’s commitment to 
BMD. Such a view matches the conventional wisdom that an external shock would reasonably 
lead Japan to reinterpret its “exclusively defensive defense” posture, as outlined in Article 9 of 
the country’s Constitution, so as to include a policy that would address similar future threats. The 
tenets of this crucial legal provision, by which Japan ostensibly renounces its right to offensive 
capabilities, are as follows: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 
force as means of settling disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “North Korean test missile flies over Japan into Pacific.” CNN. Aug. 31, 1998. Available at: 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9808/31/nkorea.missile.02/ 
2 Gittings, John. “North Korea fires missile over Japan.” The Guardian. Sept. 1, 1998. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/1998/sep/01/northkorea 
3 Wit, Joel. "The Korean peninsula energy development organization: Achievements and challenges." The 
Nonproliferation Review 6.2 (1999): 59-69. Available at: http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/wit62.pdf 
4 See Gittings. 
5 Japanese Ministry of Defense. “Japan’s BMD.” Available at: 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/bmd/bmd.pdf 
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paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.6 
According to the reasoning of the existing assumption, then, Japan would expand this legal 
definition and its related security policy in reaction to enemy actions.  
 
Yet a closer examination of the facts within the existing literature, contemporary 
newspaper articles, and government documents – combined with interviews from officials 
present for negotiations with Japan at the time – shows that this understanding vastly 
oversimplifies the history of missile defense in Japan. First, it glosses over the conceptual talks 
between Japan and the United States that predated 1998. It minimizes the internal decisions that 
laid the foundations for the 1999 MOU. Second, and most importantly, it overstates the 
outcomes that immediately followed the launch. It mistakes the MOU for joint research as 
Japan’s implicit agreement to pursue the actual deployment of a BMD system. In fact, Japan did 
not formally decide to deploy until 2003, under very different circumstances – and thus, it was 
not until 2003 that Japan made an official commitment to missile defense that it essentially could 
not reverse. 
 
These assumptions mischaracterize how and why Japan makes national security decisions 
They imply that this one “shock” prompted Japan into comprehensive action, and that focusing 
events in the security environment are of overwhelming importance in Japan’s considerations. 
They also therefore imply – incorrectly, as this thesis later shows – that the Taepodong launch 
and focusing events like it may have enough of a rallying effect to overcome significant hurdles 
endemic to Japanese culture and the US-Japan bilateral security alliance. 
 
The reality is: Japan’s deployment of BMD would not have happened when and how it 
did had North Korea’s actions in 1998 not focused Japan on the issue. Yet the Taepodong launch 
was ultimately a push, not a shove. It moved Japan one step forward along a process that had 
begun as many as five years prior, by making what was previously conceptual practical and real. 
But ultimately, “Taepodong shock” produced neither a formal policy commitment nor major 
procurement funding. Questions surrounding Japan’s constitutional restrictions, the United 
States’ commitment to BMD, and the technological feasibility and cost of missile defense all 
remained unanswered after August 1999. These factors continued to inhibit forward movement. 
As such, the MOU was merely a continuation of the process – not a leap forward – and it failed 
to address the concerns that lay at the heart of why the discussions on BMD were proceeding at a 
glacial pace in the first place. The Taepodong incident did not erase these issues for Japan. To 
suggest that it did might yield unrealistic expectations for Japan in the future. Clarifying the 
history of Japan with BMD thus becomes of greater importance – because the Taepodong 
incident must be seen within the context of the larger discussions that preceded it, as well as the 
outcomes that followed it. 
 
This thesis traces Japan’s development of ballistic missile defense capabilities, to answer 
the question of what other factors – if not the Taepodong launch alone – spurred Japan’s 
development of BMD. It follows the BMD discussions between Japan and the United States 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. “The Constitution of Japan.” 1947. Available at: 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html 
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from the late 1980s through to deployment, detailing the extensive history – in particular, the 
outcomes of the talks and working groups during the early to mid-1990s – that has in the past 
been neglected by the literature. It draws from the perspectives of those present at that time to 
show the problems that these initiatives encountered. The thesis demonstrates that the 
Taepodong launch did not sweep these problems away, and then describes how they were 
addressed before Japan’s BMD deployment in 2003. 
 
By process-tracing an area of Japanese national security history that is not of general 
knowledge, the analysis reveals previously unexplored insight into Japan’s security strategy. But 
more specifically, it serves as an example of what Japan can and will do in the face of external 
threats and alliance pressures. It shows how the United States might better cooperate with Japan 
within the bilateral relationship. Understanding Japan and recalibrating expectations for what it 
can do for the United States militarily is today more important than ever, given the US’ pivot to 
Asia. There are a number of policy concerns for the United States in that region – and Japan has 
always been, and remains for the foreseeable future, the United States’ central point in Asia from 
which to address those problems. But lingering unrealistic expectations and tepid relations – 
caused partially by disconnects on security issues like BMD  – will impede cooperation. Wanting 
more from Japan in the future pivot, without considering its past limitations and concerns, could 
hurt the alliance at a time when Japan is absolutely necessary to the United States’ strategy in 
Asia. 
 
First, this thesis begins by examining the existing body of literature. Second, it outlines 
four propositions of which factors likely mattered and why. It follows with the historical 
narrative of BMD deployment in Japan, and then ends with an analysis of the propositions in 
light of this expanded history. 
Literature 
 
Due to the highly specific nature of the topic, the community that has published works on 
Japanese missile defense progress in the 1990s and early 2000s is extremely small, consisting of 
only a few authors. The more thorough of the analyses available emphasize the importance of the 
Taepodong launch as a primary factor behind Japanese BMD, and then follow with other 
potential driving variables. Yet, for the most part, those who have written about the issue have 
usually demonstrated little interest in delving into the discussions and working groups held 
before 1998, preferring to instead discuss the early 1990s only briefly and only as background 
information. As a result, they often make throwaway statements giving the Taepodong launch 
paramount importance in driving missile defense. Hook et al. are well within the norm when they 
state that the Japanese “pursued [BMD] with vigor” only after the Taepodong incident.7 
Numerous works pinpoint August 1999’s MOU (described as a result of the missile launch) as 
the real start to Japan’s participation in BMD.8 Few papers venture more deeply into the history. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Hook, Glenn D., et al. Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security. Vol. 44. 
Routledge, 2011. Pg. 142. 
8 See Cronin, Richard P. "Japan-US Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects." 
Congressional Research Service [Library of Congress], 2002. Available at: 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9186.pdf; 
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This problem exists because most of the works are not interested specifically in the 
history of missile defense. They have larger topics of interest. Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu’s 
work on the Japanese defense industry’s role in pushing towards the militarization of space, for 
example, naturally spends most of its time on how economic pressures led into corporate activity 
on BMD, as well as business involvement in the joint studies and dialogues.9 Green, in his work 
on Japanese indigenous development of technology, likewise places missile defense within the 
larger context of joint versus indigenous defense cooperation.10 
 
Most troublesome, however, is the fact that there has been no comprehensive analysis of 
the entire history up to deployment. Even the best papers on Japanese missile defense are 
constrained by the fact that they were published before the history had played out. They are, in 
other words, products of their time. Green, for example, wrote in 1997 that joint cooperation 
would hinge on “the cost, the technical demands of ‘hitting a bullet with a bullet,’ the limitations 
imposed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the constraints placed on Japan by the 
Three Arms Export Control Principles.”11 While this may have been true in 1997, no one has 
asked whether these still remained the primary factors underlying BMD cooperation in 2002. But 
with sufficient time now having passed after deployment of BMD in Japan, this type of 
overarching analysis is possible – and can draw on previous efforts to guide the development of 
new hypotheses. The existing literature has thus far suggested several plausible causal variables: 
 
Focusing events 
 
By conventional wisdom, Japan is becoming a “normal” country, with military 
capabilities comparable to other countries uninhibited by constitutional limitations, because of 
emerging security problems in East Asia. As Andrew Oros describes this conventional wisdom, 
Japan’s remilitarization is a reaction to “no shortage of substantial security contingencies, 
including conventional and nuclear weapons proliferation, tense standoffs over the divided states 
of China/Taiwan and the Koreas, Islamic-related terrorist activity in a number of Southeast Asian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
O'Donogue, Patrick M. Theater Missile Defense in Japan: Implications for the US-China-Japan Strategic 
Relationship. DIANE Publishing, 2000. Available at: 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB66.pdf; Montague, Karen. “Japan’s Ballistic 
Missile Defense Policies and Programs.” George C. Marshall Institute. June 2014. Available at: 
http://marshall.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Japan-BMD-PO-June-14.pdf; James Martin Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. “Nuclear Threat Initiative: 
Missile.” Available at: http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/japan/delivery-systems/; Bitzinger, Richard A. 
"Asia-Pacific Missile Defense Cooperation and the United States 2004–2005: A Mixed Bag." The Asia-
Pacific and the United States 2005 (2004). 
Available at: http://www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/APandtheUS/BitzingerMissile1.pdf 
9 Pekkanen, Saadia, and Paul Kallender-Umezu. In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in 
Space Policy. Stanford University Press, 2010. Web. Ch.6  
10 Green, Michael J. Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for 
Autonomy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 
11 Green, Michael J. "Theater Missile Defense and Strategic Relations with the People's Republic of 
China." Significant Issues Series-Center For Strategic And International Studies 19 (1997): 111-118. Pg. 
111 
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states, and widespread concerns over the ‘rise’ of China.”12 In other words, the prevailing 
assumption is that Japan adjusts its conception of what is necessary and acceptable of its 
military, in line with the rising threats in its external security environment. 
 
This reasoning underlies the importance attributed particularly to North Korea and 
China’s actions. As Cronin, Giarra, and Green state: “The advocates of missile defense argue 
that Northeast Asian politics are fluid and uncertain enough to allow any number of troubling 
political scenarios… [a] threat assessment based on intentions and capabilities must take account 
of the steady proliferation and modernization of ballistic missiles…in the region.”13 Thus, the 
deployment of missile defense could be an instance of Japan reacting to the escalation of threats 
– demonstrated by specific focusing events – by neighboring countries. 
 
Alliance pressure 
 
Given that its alliance with the US is the cornerstone of its security strategy, Japan has 
historically tried to oblige its ally. Blaker, Giarra, and Vogel have characterized Japan’s position 
within the bilateral relationship as that of the “junior partner” – “a generally loyal, if sometimes 
exasperated and resentful, subordinate.” As a result, Japan has typically bent and deferred to the 
United States’ security goals as much as possible: “Rather than advancing their own agenda, 
Japanese diplomats have sought to anticipate US demands, to moderate them, and then to satisfy 
them, albeit at the lowest cost to Japan.”14 
 
US policy has deeply influenced the changes in Japan’s security posture by altering its 
strategic calculus.15 It would not be surprising to find that this influence played a significant role 
in Japan’s decisions on BMD. Japan might have decided to deploy missile defense to boost the 
US-Japan alliance, by offering it as a litmus test of the alliance’s strength. 
 
Domestic leadership 
 
Swaine et al. lists the Prime Minister and his Cabinet as one of several domestic players 
likely to influence the Government of Japan’s path on missile defense. Although the authors 
recognize that Prime Ministers cannot necessarily dictate decisions in Japan’s consensus-driven 
political process, they suggest that prime ministerial leadership is and will be crucial to the future 
of missile defense. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet have the power to reinterpret the 
Constitution so as to include BMD within the limits of Japan’s defensive posture.16 Naming 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Oros, Andrew L. Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice. NUS 
Press, 2008. Pg. 1 
13 Cronin, Patrick M., Paul Giarra, and Michael Green, “The Alliance Implications of Theater Missile 
Defense,” in Michael Green and Patrick Cronin (eds.), The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future 
(New York, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998). Pg. 174 
14 Blaker, Michael, and Paul Giarra. Case Studies in Japanese Negotiating Behavior. US Institute of 
Peace Press, 2002. Pg. 15. 
15 Kliman, Daniel M. Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New RealPolitik. 
Vol. 183. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006. Pg. 3 
16 Swaine, Michael D., Rachel M. Swanger, and Takashi Kawakami. Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense. 
Rand Corporation, 2001. Print. Pg. xii 
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Ryutaro Hashimoto and Keizo Obuchi as specific examples of Prime Ministers with an active 
interest in missile defense, Swaine et al. state: “[The Prime Minister’s office] orchestrated the 
pace and timing, decided how quickly to push forward, and worked closely with the Diet and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on how to handle the issue…and how to explain the decision to those 
at home and abroad who expressed opposition.” 
 
Swaine and his co-authors also point to comments by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, 
then still newly elected, regarding revision of the Constitution as a sign that he might eventually 
pursue BMD. The expectation that Koizumi was influential in the deployment of missile defense 
during his administration is driven by the fact that he has since been characterized as 
nationalistic, and in favor of Japan taking on a more active role internationally as well as within 
the US-Japan alliance.17 It might therefore be reasonable to suspect that his more “hawkish” 
position on military issues was a strong force behind missile defense. 
 
This expectation is also in line with the present characterizations of security changes 
happening now in Japan, given that most tend to attribute its recent constitutional 
reinterpretations to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his more nationalistic tendencies. 
 
Legal restrictions 
 
No examination of Japan’s security policy can go without consideration of the country’s 
self-imposed constitutional restrictions. According to the Government of Japan’s official view on 
Article 9 of the Constitution, Japan can only possess “the minimum necessary level of self-
defense capability.” Thus, “the possession of armaments deemed to be offensive weapons 
designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another country, which would, by definition, 
exceed the minimum necessary level, is not permissible under any circumstances.”18 Article 9 
leaves Japan in a unique position within an existing theoretical literature about how states 
compete against one another in pursuit of security. This literature also gives some indication that 
Article 9 may have had to expand to accommodate missile defense. 
 
According to neorealists such as Waltz or Jervis, states inadvertently feed into an action-
reaction process – a “security dilemma” – that leaves all states in the international system worse 
off. Each state’s acquisition of power, whether offensive is nature or not, is regarded as a threat 
to the security of other states. This, in turn, moves these other states to acquire further 
capabilities of their own.19 Offensive realists, like Mearsheimer, argue that states must act 
aggressively, and become the hegemon in this system, in order to survive. 20 But this logic 
directly contradicts Japanese law. Constitutionally, Japan cannot possess offensive capabilities. 
The government has interpreted the statute so as to specifically forbid the Self-Defense Forces 
from having even “intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), long-range strategic bombers, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 “A Turn to the Right?” The Economist. May 17, 2001. Available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/624009 
18 Japanese Ministry of Defense. “Fundamental Concepts of National Defense: The Government’s View 
on Article 9 of the Constitution.” Available at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp01.html 
19 Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30.2 (1978): 167-214. Web. 
Pg. 186-187 
20 Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton, 2001. Print. Pg. 34 
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attack aircraft carriers.”21 Japan has held firm on this issue – at least, it has on the matter of 
ballistic missiles. It has preferred to, instead, stay the shield to the United States’ sword. 
 
Japan’s constitutional restrictions therefore ostensibly place it squarely in the camp of the 
defensive realists. According to defensive realists such as Van Evera, aggression is self-
defeating, as it only raises the probability of war. Countries should instead strive to be 
defensively dominant. When the buildup of offensive weapons can be differentiated from that of 
defensive weapons, countries experience more security and arms races slow down.22 Glaser goes 
even further: when a state can persuasively reassure others that its capabilities are purely 
defensive, the security dilemma is completely eliminated. In such a case, every state can increase 
its own protection without threatening the security of others.23 
 
Given that Japan cannot pursue offensive dominance, missile defense should be an 
immediately attractive option. Yet Japan has proved incredibly resistant to the idea of working 
with the United States on BMD. It took ten years for Japan even to agree to conduct joint 
research on four parts of the interceptor missile. This suggests that the legalities of missile 
defense might have been murkier than otherwise supposed – that it may have been unclear 
whether missile defense was actually a step towards defensive, and not offensive, dominance. 
Japan must therefore have had to, at some point prior to deployment, interpreted the Constitution 
to allow missile defense. 
Propositions 
 
The literature thus points to four variables that might explain why Japan ultimately 
decided to commit to missile defense. These should not be seen as competing, as they are most 
likely complementary – and, in any case, would be difficult to separate empirically. 
P1: Focusing Event Proposition 
Japan deployed missile defense in reaction to focusing events that heightened its perception of 
the threats raised by neighboring countries.  
 
According to this proposition, missile defense in Japan was a reaction to the escalation of 
threats, demonstrated by specific focusing events, by neighboring countries. Numerous kinds of 
focusing events might have led to a heightened threat perception, including but not limited to: a 
missile launch, a government-issued threat against Japan, the termination of negotiations with 
Japan, or the movement of Navy ships into disputed territories. 
 
The first observable implication of this proposition, as summarized in Table 1, is that the 
heightened threat perception would be evidenced by public statements of condemnation from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See Japanese Ministry of Defense. Fundamental Concepts of National Defense: The Government’s 
View on Article 9 of the Constitution.” 
22 Evera, Stephen van. “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War.” International Security 22.4 (1998): 5-
43. Print. Pg. 9 
23 Glaser, Charles L. “The Security Dilemma Revisited.” World Politics 50 (1997): 171-201. Print. Pg. 
186-187 
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Japanese government officials, as well as references to the focusing event in the next Defense 
White Paper. The second observable, though more uncertain, implication is that if neighboring 
countries’ actions instead lowered threat perception, Japan would have scaled back or slowed 
down on missile defense. Such actions might have been a treaty signing, positive negotiations 
with Japan, or agreements to stop building particular offensive weapons. This implication is less 
certain because, once Japan started on missile defense, it would have been difficult to roll back 
the progress already made. 
 
 
Table 1. Focusing Event Proposition summary 
 
Propositions Observable implications 
P1: Focusing Event 
Proposition 
Japan deployed missile defense 
in reaction to focusing events 
that heightened its perception of 
the threats raised by neighboring 
countries.  
Focusing event à  Heightened threat perception à  Missile defense 
  
I1: Missile defense a reaction to escalation of threats, demonstrated by 
specific focusing events, by neighboring countries 
• Ex. Potential focusing events: a missile launch, a government-issued 
threat against Japan, termination of negotiations with Japan, movement of 
Navy ships into disputed territories, etc. 
• Escalation of threat perception evidenced by public statements of 
condemnation from Japanese government officials, reference to focusing 
event in next Defense White Paper 
I2 (uncertain): Neighboring countries actions’ that lower threat 
perception à  scaling back on missile defense 
• Ex. Actions: Treaty signing, positive negotiations, agreements to stop 
building particular offensive weaponry 
 
 
P2: Alliance Pressure Proposition 
Japan deployed missile defense because the United States communicated that Japan’s refusal to 
collaborate on BMD would prove harmful to the bilateral relationship. 
 
The first observable implication of this proposition is that progress towards missile 
defense would have followed increased pressure from the US. This pressure might have come in 
the form of statements from the US side emphasizing the importance of missile defense to the 
alliance, the description of missile defense as a measure of burden-sharing, or the provision of 
US proposals on ways to collaborate on BMD. The second implication is that the Japanese would 
have publicly acknowledged how important missile defense was to the alliance. The third 
implication is again uncertain (for the same reason as before): if pressure from the US decreased, 
Japan would have scaled back on missile defense. Decrease in the pressure applied by the US 
would have been evident from the US focusing its attentions elsewhere, or from it discussing 
US-Japan cooperation in areas other than missile defense. These implications are summarized in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2. Alliance Pressure Proposition summary 
 
Propositions Observable implications 
P2: Alliance Pressure Proposition 
Japan deployed missile defense 
because the United States 
communicated that Japan’s refusal 
to collaborate on BMD would prove 
harmful to the bilateral relationship. 
Pressure from the United States à  Missile defense 
  
I1: Progress towards missile defense follows increased pressure from 
US 
• Ex. US pressure: statements from US side emphasizing importance of 
missile defense to alliance (refusal of joint initiative would hurt 
security arrangement, joining would bring two countries closer together 
as allies), description of missile defense as measure of burden-sharing, 
proposals from US on ways to collaborate 
I2: Japanese acknowledgement of importance of missile defense to 
alliance 
I3 (uncertain): Decrease in pressure from US à  scaling back in 
missile defense 
• Ex. Decrease in pressure: US focusing attentions elsewhere, 
discussions of US-Japan cooperation in other areas 
  
• Pressure would come from US Dept. of Defense, US State Dept., 
President 	  	  
P3: Domestic Leadership Proposition 
Japan deployed missile defense when it did because a nationalistic Prime Minister in favor of 
remilitarization came into power. 
 
This proposition has three similar observable implications, described in Table 3. The first 
is that progress on BMD efforts would have followed the choice of a Prime Minister supportive 
of missile defense. That support might have come in various forms: the Prime Minister might be 
characterized as nationalistic or hawkish, or may have made statements of interest in missile 
defense or remilitarization. The second, but uncertain, implication is that a Prime Minister 
ambivalent on missile defense would lead to a pause or a slowdown on BMD efforts. The third, 
similarly uncertain, implication is that a Prime Minister who is critical of missile defense would 
roll back previous efforts. This might also lead to a decrease in the funds allocated to missile 
defense. 
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Table 3. Domestic Leadership Proposition summary 
 
Propositions Observable implications 
P3: Domestic Leadership Proposition 
Japan deployed missile defense when it did 
because a nationalistic Prime Minister in 
favor of remilitarization came into power. 
Prime Ministerial support à  Missile defense 
  
I1: Prime Minister supportive of missile defense à  progress 
on missile defense efforts 
• Ex. Prime Ministerial support: statements of interest in 
missile defense or remilitarization, characterization as 
nationalistic or more hawkish 
I2 (uncertain): Prime Minister ambivalent about missile 
defense à  pause on missile defense efforts, slowdown, lack of 
progress towards deployment 
I3 (uncertain): Prime Minister critical of missile defense à  
rolling back previous efforts made, decrease in funds allocated 
to missile defense 
 
P4: Legal Restrictions Proposition 
Japan deployed missile defense because it was the only purely defensive mechanism, and 
therefore the only system not restricted by constitutional limitations, capable of addressing the 
missile threat. 
 
This proposition, summarized in Table 4, suggests that changes in Japan’s interpretation 
of the Constitution preceded missile defense. The first implication is that there must have been a 
shift in Japan’s official understanding of what Article 9 does or does not allow. These legal 
decisions might have entailed changes in the definition of missile defense as strictly defensive, 
the clarification of collective self-defense on whether to intercept missile directed at US, and the 
relaxation of ban on arms exports. If such shifts did occur, they would have been explained in 
Japan’s Defense White Papers, official government statements, and the National Defense 
Program Guidelines. A related observable implication is that, if there was confusion over 
whether missile defense was allowed, there would have been a lack of progress towards 
deployment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   15	  
Table 4. Legal Restrictions Proposition summary 
 
Propositions Observable implications 
P4: Legal Restrictions Proposition 
Japan deployed missile defense 
because it was the only purely 
defensive mechanism, and therefore 
the only system not restricted by 
constitutional limitations, capable of 
addressing the missile threat. 
Change in interpretation of Constitution à  missile defense 
  
I1: Shift in Japan’s official understanding of what Article 9 does or 
does not allow – explained in Defense White Paper, official 
government statements, National Defense Program Guidelines 
• Legal decisions to allow missile defense: definition of missile 
defense as strictly defensive, clarification of collective self-defense 
on whether to intercept missile directed at US, possible relaxation of 
ban on arms exports 
I2: Confusion over whether missile defense allowed à  lack of 
progress towards deployment 
  
• Shift going to be precipitated by another causal variable – possibly one 
of other three hypotheses (focusing event, Prime Minister, pressure from 
US) pushing JDA towards reinterpretation 
Methods 
 
This analysis draws initially from the existing literature on Japan’s history with missile 
defense, and supplements this information with interviews. 
 
Existing literature 
 
The existing literature serves to first highlight clearly incorrect hypotheses: a source 
might, for example, indicate that, given the time frame of ballistic missile defense development, 
it may simply be impossible for a certain variable to have contributed to BMD deployment in 
Japan. As previously established, however, the literature is insufficient for eliminating any one of 
the hypotheses completely. Although it may indicate that certain scenarios are more likely than 
others, it does not provide enough evidence to establish a case against a hypothesis. The 
literature is too thin, and too incomprehensive, to do so. Sources include not only academic, 
secondary-source papers, but also includes primary documents: official government documents, 
such as Japan’s Annual Defense White Paper and press releases; statements from government 
officials, as quoted in news reports from both American and Japanese media; and Congressional 
Research Service reports. 
 
Interviews 
 
This thesis follows the leads from the existing literature in interviews with policy 
specialists and former government officials. Results are based on interviews with seven experts. 
Interviewees include not only experts within the Japan defense policy sphere, but also 
Department of Defense, State Department, military officials, and industry leaders who were once 
involved in the US-Japan negotiations during the 1990s and early 2000s. They are: 
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1. Dr. James Auer, former Special Assistant for Japan in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense and current Director of the Center for US-Japan Studies and Cooperation at 
Vanderbilt University 
2. Dr. Ken Jimbo, Associate Professor at Keio University and Senior Follow at The 
Tokyo Foundation 
3. Commander Paul Giarra, US Navy (Ret.), Senior Country Director for Japan in the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 
4. Lieutenant Colonel Robin “Sak” Sakoda, Senior Japan Director in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and Senior Policy Advsior and Executive Assistant to the 
Deputy Secretary of State 
5. Gregg A. Rubinstein, Deputy Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Office at the 
Tokyo US Embassy, Vice President of the International Trade and Technology 
Association, and Director of Policy and Planning at Grumman International, Inc. 
6. Masato Nagase, Deputy Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Mitsubishi Corporation’s 
Ship, Aerospace & Transportation Systems Division 
7. Hiroshi Tajima, General Manager of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Aircraft & Special 
Vehicle Headquarters and Executive Advisor of Mitsubishi Corporation’s Aerospace 
Division 
Interviewees were generally chosen either because they had previously written on the issue of 
missile defense or because others recommended them as potential contacts. Four of the seven 
interviewees were American; two of the seven are now academics, while the remaining five 
currently work as independent defense consultants. The Americans were all formerly associated 
with either the Department of Defense or the State Department, while two of the three Japanese 
interviewees once worked for Mitsubishi Corporation. 
 
Some of these interviewees were more willing to share material in part due to the passage 
of time: it has been over a decade since some of the working groups and events discussed in the 
thesis. Six of the seven interviewees are now retired, and most now work at their own 
consultancies. It is possible that, because they were now free of direct ties to the current 
governments or to companies with bids on missile defense contracts, they might have been more 
open to speaking than they previously had been. 
 
Clearly, there should be some concerns about the fact that four of the seven come from 
the same network of experts and diplomats. It is more than probable that they have similar 
answers or worldviews, and that drawing inferences from their responses results in a biased 
product with gaps of knowledge. But the process of gaining interviewees through contacts was 
unavoidable. It might, in fact, be desirable, given that those most experienced in this issue are the 
members of the small US team on the ground that was actually negotiating with Japan. The 
interviewees here were those actually articulating the United States’ policy positions, and 
speaking with their counterparts on the Japanese side. 
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Results 	  
Historical Narrative of Japanese Involvement with Ballistic Missile Defense 
 
Japan joins Star Wars despite past disasters in technological collaboration 
 
Official Japanese involvement with ballistic missile defense ostensibly began in 
September 1986, when Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda issued a public statement 
affirming Japan’s participation in President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. 
Brushing aside concerns that involvement might run contrary to a 1969 resolution limiting the 
use of space to non-military activities, Gotoda announced that Japan had quite simply “decided 
to enter into consultations with the United States government on specific measures,” in the hopes 
that their research together would lead to technological progress and commercial applications for 
both countries. At the briefing that followed, however, a Japanese Foreign Ministry official 
expressed mixed feelings on SDI. There were many, particularly at the management level, 
concerned that not only was there little commercial potential in the output of SDI research, but 
that Japanese corporations would also be barred by the United States from using whatever little 
did result for commercial interests. 24 There existed the largely unspoken suspicion that the 
United States had brought Japan on for the “hidden purpose” of taking Japanese technology, in 
“a kind of reverse Pearl Harbor, a technological ‘sneak attack’ by the United States…[where] the 
US [would] get all this technology and then decide not to share it, citing US security interests.” 25 
 
Unsurprisingly, Japanese participation in SDI yielded nothing substantial. Given these 
existing fears, the United States’ attempt to bring Japan into its SDI framework could not have 
come at a worse possible time, just as US actions brought on the unfortunate “FSX crisis.” For 
over a decade, Japanese industry had wanted, and planned on, developing an indigenously 
designed fighter jet, the FSX. But in the late 1980s, the United States killed those plans and 
instead strong-armed Japan into signing an MOU for joint development of the FSX – only for 
Congress to then turn around and accuse Japan of trying to weaken the US aerospace industry by 
stealing American technology.26 The FSX dispute, once called “the bitterest US-Japan 
negotiations in the post-war era,”27 naturally did not bode well for cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Yates, Ronald E. “Team to Study Japan’s Role in SDI.” Chicago Tribune. Oct. 24, 1986. Available at: 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-10-24/news/8603200016_1_sdi-japanese-political-leaders-
japanese-foreign-ministry-official 
25 Yates, Ronald E. “Japan Buys into SDI, But Wonders if It’ll Pay Off.” Chicago Tribune. Sept. 10, 
1986. Available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-09-10/news/8603070526_1_sdi-japanese-
foreign-ministry-official-nuclear-weapons 
26 See Green, Michael J. Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search 
for Autonomy. Pg. 86-107. 
27 See Blaker, Michael, and Paul Giarra. Pg. 87. 
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Missile defense agenda driven by trade negotiations and alliance management 
 
In those “early – it’s the economy, stupid’ – post-Cold War years,”28 trade, rather than 
security, issues dominated the US-Japan alliance. Amidst a rising US trade deficit, sentiments in 
the United States towards Japan, whose trade surplus in 1986 totaled $58.6 billion (or about one-
third of the US’ deficit), soured.29 By 1990, polls had 60 percent of the general American public 
calling Japan’s economic power a “critical threat to the US.” One CIA-sponsored study even 
declared, “Japan is an economic superpower whose world dominance appears inescapable and 
incontrovertible, absent some dramatic unified reassertion of Western intent…Mainstream 
Japanese… are creatures of an ageless, amoral, manipulative and controlling culture.”30 An 
economically powerful Japan was anathema to the United States’ interests, and “no one single 
country accounted for more of the perceived imbalance in US trade than Japan.”31 
 
When the Soviet Union was still in power, and the United States needed its relationship 
with Japan to act as its counterbalance in Asia, it set aside these tensions for the sake of the 
alliance. When the Soviet Union fell and the Cold War ended, however, such sentiments were 
allowed to overwhelm the security interests of the alliance. There was no explicit reason for the 
alliance to even exist anymore, leading to “a period of mutual antipathy and domestic 
fractiousness that gave both countries pause for thought.”32 The bilateral relationship was 
officially “adrift.” But missile defense, for those who saw the importance of preserving the US-
Japan alliance, was one of the few opportunities available for reworking the relationship and 
bringing the two countries together into closer collaboration. 	  
Missile defense research begins with the WESTPAC Study and TMD Working Group 	  
In 1989, the US Department of Defense and the Strategic Defense Initiative Operation 
(SDIO) formalized SDI research in the $8 million Western Pacific Missile Defense Architecture 
(WESTPAC) Study. Numerous Japanese industry companies entered bids to conduct this 
research for the DOD. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) eventually won out, and was chosen 
to lead a group of five American and seven Japanese companies.33 The WESTPAC Study was 
conducted over four years, with the intent of answering the basic question of whether missile 
defense was necessary in the region, and if yes, what the best architecture of missile defense 
would be.34 The initiative followed three phases. In FY 1989, it examined the conventional 
missile threat, in 1990, the non-conventional missile threat, and in 1991, the defense of a 1000 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Rubinstein, Gregg. Personal interview. Oct. 7, 2014. 
29 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Diplomatic Bluebook Section 3. North America” 1987. 
Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1987/1987-3-3.htm 
30 Berger, Suzanne and Kenneth A. Oye. “It isn’t Cold War II.” The New York Times. Dec. 9, 1991. 
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/09/opinion/it-isn-t-cold-war-ii.html 
31 Krauss, Ellis S., and T. John Pempel, eds. Beyond Bilateralism: US-Japan Relations in the New Asia 
Pacific. Stanford University Press, 2004. Pg. 11. 
32 See Blaker, Michael, and Paul Giarra. Pg. 94 
33 See Pekkanen, Saadia, and Paul Kallender-Umezu. Ch. 6. 
34 Nagase, Masato and Hiroshi Tajima. Personal interview. Oct. 5, 2014. 
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n.m. radius around Japan.35 At the end of WESTPAC in April 1993, MHI returned to SDIO with 
a 421-page report on the group’s findings.36 It stated that, yes, missile defense was indeed 
necessary, and that Japan and the United States should pursue a multi-tier missile defense 
architecture.37 
 
Although the Government of Japan was briefed on the report’s progress and outcomes, it 
did not actively participate in the WESTPAC Study.38 But in terms of intangibles, the 
WESTPAC Study proved a valuable experience for both the American and Japanese defense 
industries. In contrast to the FSX negotiations, the TMD discussions and meetings between the 
companies were “very friendly and cooperative.” The WESTPAC Study required that MHI and 
the Japanese companies meet in “regular executive level as well as working level face-to-face 
meetings and social gatherings with their counterparts of major US [missile defense] 
contractors,” such as Raytheon, McDonnell Douglas, and Lockheed. This engendered more 
personal relationships within the industry, leading to an environment conducive to collaboration 
between the companies. Indeed, in the words of one Japanese participant, the Japanese had 
“good enthusiasm but no hesitation about working with USA.”39 	  
Six months later, the United States approached Japan with a more formal – though 
ultimately ill-considered – proposition of participation in the Clinton Administration’s theater 
missile defense (TMD) efforts. In October 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin met with the 
JDA and Japanese industry to offer Japan three options: joint development, the purchase of TMD 
off-the-shelf from American companies, or gradual technology exchanges. The Japanese balked 
at the absolute demand that they share their technologies. To many in Tokyo, it seemed that trade 
considerations had once again usurped Japan’s actual security interests. The United States had 
“overplayed its hand.”40 
 
Even worse, the US side did not even have a clear, singular vision of what it wanted from 
its ally. Not only were the Department of Defense and the State Department competing against 
one another for influence, their interests were also contrary to those held by the White House, 
Commerce, and Treasury Department. No agency in discussions with Japan had any actual 
authority for negotiating terms of agreement on missile defense. For those early years, “the two 
national systems were out of synch internally and with each other.” 41 In essence, the US 
government side was a mess, and inadvertently alienated Japan when it played into its ally’s 
doubts about how committed the United States actually was to the security of Japan. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 MG Malcolm O’Neill. “Strategic Defense Initiative Advance Planning Briefing for Industry.” United 
States Department of Defense. Mar. 2, 1992. Available at: 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/homeland_defense/strategic_defense_initiative/425.pdf 
36 Monterey Institute of International Studies. “Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in Northeast Asia: An 
Annotated Chronology, 1990-Present.” Mar. 13, 2003. Available at: 
http://cns.miis.edu/archive/bmd_neasia/bmdchron.pdf 
37 See Nagase, Masato and Hiroshi Tajima. 
38 See Blaker, Michael, and Paul Giarra. Pg. 109 
39 See Nagase, Masato and Hiroshi Tajima. 
40 See Cronin, Patrick M., Paul Giarra, and Michael Green, Pg. 172 
41 See Blaker, Michael, and Paul Giarra. Pg. 102 
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The United States regrouped, and eventually “recast TMD as an alliance management 
issue”42 that in December 1993 led the two countries to form the bilateral US-Japan Theater 
Missile Defense Working Group (TMDWG). Initially led by the Department of Defense’s Office 
of Asian and Pacific Affairs, the TMDWG explored the evolution of threats in East Asia, the 
capabilities that would be required to address those threats, and the potential areas for 
collaboration.43 
 
Tomiichi Murayama becomes Prime Minister 
 
The formation of this group coincided with a particularly tumultuous time in Japanese 
politics that resulted in leadership ambivalent on missile defense. In July 1993, the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan, the ruling party for 38 years, lost its majority in the Diet. It 
then returned in 1994, as part of a coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) that elected 
Japan’s first Socialist Prime Minister in 47 years, Tomiichi Murayama.44 The Socialist Party had 
long held the view that the US-Japan Security Treaty establishing the alliance should be 
abolished. It had also questioned the constitutionality of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.45 
When it came into power with the LDP, the Socialists were forced to accept the constitutionality 
of both the alliance and the SDF. In return, Murayama was allowed to harden his opposition to 
TMD.46 During the SDP’s annual convention in October that year, it proposed abandoning TMD 
entirely due to its cost, which would pull away funds needed for other procurement programs. 
Additionally, some doubted whether the Patriot missile could actually intercept its targets, and 
whether TMD was even necessary in the region.47 
 
Discussions within TMDWG at policy level include numerous conceptual TMD plans 
 
Nonetheless, even without the support of the leading political party of Japan, discussions 
within the US-Japan Working Group moved forward through talks at the policy level, between 
professional officials at State/Defense and JDA/MOFA. At times, these meetings included 
representatives up to the Office Director or the Deputy Assistant Secretary.48 
 
At the TMDWG’s second meeting in May 1994, the Pentagon’s Ballistic Missile Defense 
Office (BMDO) presented Japan with a 40-page document called “Japan’s Choices Regarding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See Cronin, Patrick M., Paul Giarra, and Michael Green. Pg. 172 
43 Rubinstein, Gregg. Personal interview. Oct. 7, 2014. 
44 “Major Political Parties in Japan.” The Washington Post. July 1998. Available at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/japan/japanparties.htm 
45 Jameson, Sam. “Socialist Named Premier in Japan: Asia: Tomiichi Murayama is chosen with support of 
his party's archenemies. Analysts expect greater strain on U.S. trade relations, while Tokyo business 
world is shocked.” Los Angeles Times. June 30, 1994. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1994-06-
30/news/mn-10296_1_japan-trade-relations 
46 See Green, Michael J. Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search 
for Autonomy. Pg. 138. 
47 Goozner, Merrill. “Japan Balks at Buying into Mini-SDI System.” Chicago Tribune. Nov. 3, 1994. 
Available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-11-03/news/9411030061_1_anti-missile-patriot-
missile-theater-missile-defense 
48 See Rubinstein, Gregg. Personal interview. 
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TMD.” This paper was written on the “supposition of two types of missile attacks – one from 
‘the DPRK (North Korea)’ and the other from ‘North Korea and China.’”49 It presented four 
potential routes for TMD collaboration: 
 
1. A Japanese forward-deployed navy upper-tier, ground lower-tier system at a cost of 
$4.5 billion (based on upgrades of existing Japanese plans to deploy four Aegis 
destroyers, four AWACS, and twenty-four land-based Patriot fire units); 
2. A Japanese deployed-in-bastion navy upper-tier, ground lower-tier system at a cost of 
$16.3 billion (based on upgrades of existing deployment plans plus two new Aegis 
and new surveillance radar for support); 
3. A Japanese ground upper-tier, lower-tier system centered on six THAAD sites at a 
cost of $8.8 billion 
4. A Japanese combined upper-tier ground lower-tier system combining five THAAD 
sites and existing Patriots and Aegis at a cost of $8.9 billion50 
 
Plans take shape within US-Japan Bilateral Study for BMD	  	  
Japan gave its first indication of real interest in August of the same year, when the JDA 
placed its first request for a budget between 2-3 million yen and 20-30 million yen for examining 
the TMD project in FY1995.51 The JDA’s Procurement Bureau then discreetly backed an 
industry working group, called the “Air Defense Systems Research Group,” consisting of eight 
defense companies within the Japan Association of Defense Industries (JADI) that would 
consider the four options that the BMDO had presented Japan. This group was naturally 
concerned that further delays would cause Japanese industry to lose the chance for co-
development and construction of a TMD system, estimated at the time with a worth of anywhere 
between one to three trillion yen. It was, as the BMDO’s document called it, “the last military 
business opportunity for this century.”52 Indeed, the defense industry was more eager to 
participate than anyone in the JDA or MOFA. As the executive officer of Mitsubishi Electric 
stated, the company would start its own TMD research and, “as the top missile maker…be ready 
to deal with anything.”53 
 
The ADS Study served simply as the bridge between the WESTPAC Study and the 
crucial entity that followed. Formed in October of 1994 by the Government of Japan, the US-
Japan (DOD-JDA) Bilateral Study for BMD was to continue analyzing the missile threat to 
Japan and the potential architectures for a Japanese missile defense system.54 In contrast to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 “Cold Peace: Choice of TMD; U.S. Shows Threat Scenario.” Mainichi Shimbun. Mar. 17, 1995. 
Available at: http://fas.org/news/japan/eas95056.htm 
50 See Green, Michael J. Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search 
for Autonomy. Pg. 138. 
51 DA Requests Funding to Examine TMD Project.” Mainichi Shimbun. Aug. 5, 1994. Available at: 
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52 See “Cold Peace: Choice of TMD; U.S. Shows Threat Scenario.” 
53 “Defense Technology – Theater Missile Defense.” Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun. May 8, 1995. Available at: 
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54 “Japan Gets Serious about Missile Defense: North Korean Crisis Pushes Debate." Asia-Pacific Center 
for Security Studies 2003(2). 
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ADS Study, which was funded solely by JADI, the Bilateral Study was in fact JDA-funded: 
responsibility for the study was contracted out by the government to JADI, which then 
outsourced it to Mitsubishi Heavy. The US-Japan Bilateral Study was crucial, because according 
to Masato Nagase and Hiroshi Tajima, two former executives from MHI, “The SM-3 joint 
development idea for collaboration was derived from this activity.” That is, the idea to jointly 
research the SM-3 BlockIIA missile – the very foundation of the 1999 MOU – emerged out of 
talks begun five years earlier, in 1994. 55 The idea was already under consideration half a decade 
before North Korea fired its Taepodong towards Japan. 
 
Japan moves towards internal consensus within individual agencies as China rises 
 
Japanese involvement further accelerated in 1995, after the government set aside 20 
million yen for TMD research as requested by the JDA.56 By February of 1995, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) had also agreed to actively promote the TMD project as part of a joint 
communiqué affirming the US-Japan Security Treaty. It described TMD in its internal document 
as “an important project in conducting smooth and effective operation of the Japan-US security 
system.” 57 The JDA then ordered Nissan Motors and Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) to 
produce by the end of the year a prototype, of a new TMD interception missile with its flight 
controlled by thrusters systems.58 Research on the Japanese side proceeded unilaterally, with the 
government funding initiatives with Japanese defense contractors as it continued to hesitate on 
the issue of whether to proceed together with the United States. 
 
The JDA was the first of the government agencies to actively argue for BMD. Mid-1995, 
it released a report, called “On Research Concerning Ballistic Missile Defense,” that advocated 
for Japan’s further study of technologies that would be useful in a BMD system. Japan’s existing 
capabilities, the report claimed, were inadequate for addressing the missile threat – namely, 
North Korea and a hypothetical 1,000 km.-range ballistic missile – to the country. It called for 
Japan to pursue several initiatives: “satellite-linked sensor systems, a more capable weapons 
system, and a highly integrated C3I system.” This report, according to Swaine et al., had been 
privately approved by both the Prime Minister’s office and by MOFA. They had all agreed by 
then that some form of missile defense was needed – even if none was ready to publicly state 
such a position just yet. Action from the government did follow: the Security Council and the 
Ministry of Finance budgeted 25.15 trillion yen for another five-year defense plan to study the 
“usefulness and cost-effectiveness of TMD” – only to then step back due to the Social 
Democratic Party’s objection to the wording. The final version reassured that the plan was not a 
commitment to fully participate in the program. Nonetheless, the JDA announced several days 
later that it would allocate 295 million yen, or $2.85 million, to BMD concept studies in 1996.59 	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In March of 1996, China utilized its missile capabilities in a very public display of force 
– one directed not at Japan, but at Taiwan, which was about to re-elect Lee Teng-hui by direct 
vote.60 As part of a weeklong military exercise, China fired four DF-15 short-range missiles into 
the vicinity of Taiwan, though not over the island or into the strait.61 For Japan, this act raised not 
only the possibility that it might be drawn into a conflict between the United States and China 
over Taiwan, but that China, with its intermediate-range missiles, might pose a threat to Japan in 
such a regional dispute.62 It was apparent China was aggressively pursuing ballistic missiles as 
the “centerpiece of their capabilities,” and that they were developing their entire nuclear posture 
around these missiles.63 By then, the territorial dispute between Japan and China over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands had also become a problem for the two countries’ relationship – as well 
as for the bilateral alliance, when the United States did not rush to support Japan. 
 
Yet, in spite of these issues, the mid-1990s were still characterized by an agenda of 
engagement with China. It was not yet an immediate threat to Japan, and any concerns that 
Japanese officials harbored about China were generally shared privately and cautiously.64 
Instead, if these issues with China highlighted anything, it was that the security alliance needed 
affirmation and clarification. In April 1996, amidst unrest over the significant presence of US 
forces and bases in Japan, President Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto signed the 
“Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the Twenty-First Century.” Among its 
provisions was their joint recognition that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction posed 
a danger to both countries, and a commitment to “continue to cooperate in the ongoing study on 
ballistic missile defense.”65 	  
Meanwhile, the individual agencies continued to move forward on BMD. The JDA set 
aside 440 million yen for TMD R&D in 1996. It then signed an MOU under which the United 
States would provide Japan with TMD information that the Japanese defense contractors would 
keep confidential. Official news reports speculated soon afterwards that the JDA would make 
finalize plans on whether to pursue TMD by summer of 1997.66 According to one US official, the 
United States, at some point over the course of the TMD Working Group, received reassurances 
from the Japanese that not only would they be moving forward, but that they would be doing it 
together with the United States. They agreed with the US’ identification of the military challenge 
ahead of them, and agreed that they were committed to the development of ballistic missile 
defense. Though not a formal commitment to TMD collaboration, it was a sufficient 
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demonstration of intention to sustain the American side.67 As promised, by 1997, the JDA had 
concluded internally that the Navy Theater-Wide program, pushed by the US Navy and the 
Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces, would present the best opportunity for US-Japan 
bilateral technical TMD efforts.68  	  
Japan hesitates and delays decision at last minute in 1998 	  
Between 1995 and 1998, Japan had spent a total of 560 million yen on studying TMD.69 
In a sign of the JDA’s commitment to BMD for FY1999, however, it was ready to devote up to 
twice as much to TMD research for that one year as had been spent in those past four years. 
According to the Japanese media, by early August of 1998, the JDA had drafted a budget that 
would request anywhere between 500 million to 1 billion yen for research and development of 
missile defense technologies. The draft was due by August 31 to the Ministry of Finance for 
approval.70 
 
But two weeks before the deadline, around August 20, the political landscape forced the 
JDA to reconsider the timing of its request. China’s President Jiang Zemin was scheduled to visit 
Japan in September, marking the first ever visit to the country by a Chinese president. An 
announcement implying Japan’s great interest in BMD – a touchy subject for China, which had 
previously voiced its opposition to such a system – might anger Beijing and endanger the 
diplomatic mission. So instead, the JDA requested 100 million yen for preliminary study, and 
masked the project by placing it under the headline of “Other Items” in the draft budget. But this 
was all merely a delay in the JDA’s plans. It would request the rest of money in December, after 
President Jiang’s visit was over. The project would then be included in the Ministry of Finance’s 
final version of the budget as “Joint Research on BMD.” 71 
 
North Korea fires Taepodong missile and sets MOU into motion 
 
Just two weeks after the media speculation, on August 31, North Korea fired its 
Taepodong missile over Japan. The political calculus changed yet again. Plans discussed in the 
working groups took on greater urgency. Within the next year, Japan and the US signed on to the 
MOU establishing joint research of the SM-3 BlockIIA missile. It is important to note, however, 
that the terms of the MOU limited its importance in the overall scheme of BMD development. 
 
The Government of Japan ensured – as part of the negotiations for the MOU, as well as 
prior to the Taepodong launch – that it would only pursue joint TMD research if that research did 
not lead directly into a procurement decision.72 That is, Japan distinguished between the research, 
development, and deployment stages of acquiring BMD technologies. Its signature on the MOU 
for research did not signify that procurement would immediately follow at the end of the five-	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year program. An entirely separate political decision would need to be made before advancing to 
the next phase. It was also possible that Japan would eventually move forward with a different 
system entirely than the one explored in the research stage.73 As such, research, as a “pre-
acquisition technology development program,” was considerably low-risk. In only committing to 
this one step towards BMD capabilities, Japan could move forward without making any 
decisions about acquisition or addressing “current constitutional interpretations [that would] 
appear to rule out the integration of any such Japanese capability with that of the US Navy.”74 
 
Developments in the US affect long-term potential for Japanese BMD 
 
Research as agreed under the MOU pushed forward over the next several years, even as 
the circumstances of the security environment and of the alliance changed. The pursuit of 
ballistic missile defense took on a greater sense of urgency when President George W. Bush 
came into office. Adopting a position on missile defense fundamentally different from that of his 
predecessor, he made it clear, from the beginning of his presidency, that ballistic missile defense 
would play a much more significant role in his security strategy and in his expectations for the 
United States’ allies. 
 
First, in a speech delivered in May 2001, the President announced that the United States 
would no longer abide by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, a bilateral treaty adopted in 
1972 that stipulated that the United States and the Soviet Union would each be limited to the 
deployment of only one anti-ballistic missile interception system – and thus only protect either 
the national capital or a site containing intercontinental ballistic missile silo launchers. He stated, 
“We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different 
threats of today’s world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old 
ABM Treaty.”75 Later that year, the United States formally announced its unilateral withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty, as the President explained, “The ABM Treaty hinders our government’s 
ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile 
attacks.”76 
 
Second, in that same speech from May 2001, President Bush erased the distinctions that 
existed between theater missile defense (TMD), meant to protect a particular region against 
short-range and theater-range missiles, and national missile defense (NMD), or systems to 
defend the United States’ territory against long-range missiles.77 This explicitly tied Japan into 
the US system – as “one tier of a multi-tiered defense of the United States and its interests.” 	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Naturally, this immediately raised questions of whether Japan would intercept a missile directed 
not at Japan, but at the United States. Participation in a system with such an objective might 
arguably violate Japan’s restrictions on collective self-defense.78 But when asked about the shift 
in the United States’ position, Deputy Press Secretary Chikahito Harada reiterated, “This missile 
defense is for a purely defensive purpose: to shoot down missiles directed toward Japan.”79 The 
JDA was more specific, though it similarly hedged against addressing the problem: “We can 
understand US thinking about regarding NMD and TMD as a comprehensive package, but our 
position will not change: we will only carry on joint research on the TMD.”80 Once again, the 
questions of legality surrounding missile defense would have to wait. They would not hinder 
current research, but Japan was not ready to address these concerns just yet.  
 
US defense industry demonstrates feasibility of hitting a bullet with a bullet 
 
These policy developments in the United States came just as the American defense 
industry demonstrated the potential of missile defense. In March that year, the BMDO and the 
US Army conducted a test of the Patriot PAC-3 missile, which saw two PAC-3 missiles 
successfully intercept a Hera ballistic missile target and one PAC-2 missile hit a Patriot missile 
target. The PAC-3 missile had previously already passed eight flight tests, intercepting various 
targets six out of six times.81 As Lockheed Martin declared afterwards, the missile had “a perfect 
flight test record.”82 
 
By 2003, the US had also conducted several tests of its Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 
systems, designed to catch short- to medium-range ballistic missiles at sea. It ran three tests in 
2002, which saw the SM-3 missile intercept its short-range target every time. In June 2003, the 
SM-3 missed its short-range target. In December 2003, it hit its medium-range target.83 By 
December 2002, the director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), formerly known as the 
BMDO, was confident enough to say, “What we do know is that our fundamental technology of 
hit-to-kill works. A few years ago, I could not tell you that with confidence…We have the ability 
to integrate these elements…and to make them effective.”84 The seemingly impossible task of 
“hitting a bullet with a bullet” had now been demonstrated as possible, even if imperfect. 
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Domestic and external changes in Asia simultaneously push BMD towards development 
 
Within a few months of President Bush’s inauguration, Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi also came into power. He then installed JDA chief Shigeru Ishiba, who would become 
the face of Japanese BMD while the Prime Minister took on a less visible, less active role on the 
matter. Ishiba, once called “Japan’s hawk-in-chief,”85 was particularly reactive as North Korea 
ratcheted up its rhetoric and provocations over the next three years. 
 
It was already understood that North Korea possessed the capability to hit all major cities 
on the Japanese mainland, given its stockpile of 100 Nodong missiles with a range of 1000 miles. 
But Japan’s worry over conventional missiles paled in comparison to its fears over the DPRK’s 
nuclear capabilities. In October 2002, a US delegation confirmed its suspicions that North Korea 
was in the midst of restarting its nuclear program, and had again built up a secret project to make 
nuclear weapons from highly enriched uranium.86 Not one month afterwards, Ishiba publicly 
stated, “We should exert efforts to get the [missile defense] program to leave the research phase 
as soon as possible”87 – despite the fact that the research was only three years in to a five-year 
program. 
 
The situation with Pyongyang only worsened in the following months. The Government 
of Japan’s reaction, as expressed through Ishiba, reasonably escalated as well. After the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) stopped oil shipments to North Korea, the 
DPRK expelled all International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from the country.88 It 
then removed metal seals and shut off the surveillance equipment at its plutonium reprocessing 
plant at Yongbyon.89 As if this was not enough, it officially withdrew from the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty in January 2003. For the JDA, these moves were provocative enough to 
lead Ishiba to tell Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that Japan should “study the [joint 
missile defense program] with an eye toward a future move to development and deployment.” 
Although Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda publicly distanced the Government of Japan from 
Ishiba’s comment, saying that it had not yet agreed on the necessity of BMD, it has been 
suggested that Ishiba was in fact testing the waters on missile defense with the Cabinet’s implicit 
permission. If the public and the Diet were receptive to Ishiba’s remarks, the Koizumi 
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administration would follow through with its plans for accelerating the timeline on missile 
defense; if not, it might reconsider its position. 90 
 
Given that a poll from the Asahi Shimbun found around that time that 95 percent of 
Japanese respondents surveyed were “concerned” about North Korea’s nuclear program,91 it is 
unsurprising that the JDA followed Ishiba’s direction. Its next Defense White Paper concluded, 
in an unprecedented interpretation of Japan’s constitutional restrictions, that intercepting ballistic 
missiles over Japanese air space – even if those missiles were flying towards the United States – 
would not violate its ban on collective self-defense.92 It urged policymakers to accept missile 
defense as a means for combating “unpredictable threats, such as ballistic missile and terrorist 
attacks.”93 As the White Paper articulated, “Based on the current situation, in which Japan does 
not possess an effective missile defense system, ballistic missile defense is an important and 
pressing matter for our country’s defense policy.”94 
 
In early December of 2003, the press reported that the JDA would spend 500 billion yen 
acquiring, over a period of three years from FY2004/2005 to 2007/2008, a missile defense 
system from the United States. It had already requested 142 billion yen for FY2004. The JDA 
expected the system to come into operation in 2007, and be fully deployed by FY2011 or 2012 at 
the earliest. When asked about whether any decision had been made to introduce a BMD system, 
Prime Minister Koizumi was noncommittal, saying: “I will give it thorough consideration as 
such moves are likely to come up as we compile the budget.”95 
 
Japan’s enthusiasm culminates in Koizumi administration deployment of BMD 
 
Two weeks later on December 19, 2003, after making statements to the press indicating 
otherwise, the Koizumi administration announced its Cabinet decision to deploy a ballistic 
missile defense system – with capabilities focused, not on its own research into the SM-3 
BlockIIA missile, but on the acquisition of PAC-3 and Aegis SM-3 Block IA missiles. The 
statement released by the Chief Cabinet Secretary addressed several points of contention. First, it 
argued that interception tests and performance evaluations conducted in the United States had 
convinced the Government of Japan that missile defense was now technologically feasible: “It is 
concluded that these systems with high technological reliability meets the high technical 
standards to enable the introduction.” Second, it asserted that the missile defense system “is the 
only and purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect life and property of the 	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citizens of Japan against ballistic missile attacks.” Under this reasoning, BMD fell within the 
limits of Japan’s purely defensive security posture, and should not threaten neighboring 
countries. Third, because the BMD system would intercept missiles in accordance with Japan’s 
“own independent judgment” and would not be used to defend third countries, it did not violate 
restrictions against collective self-defense.96 
Analysis of Propositions under Historical Narrative 	  
This narrative reveals that the propositions and assumptions previously noted, while 
intuitively on the right track, generally require greater nuance to account for the varied history of 
BMD in Japan.  
Focusing Event Proposition 
 
The Focusing Event Proposition is lacking in light of the historical narrative. It would be 
correct to say that missile defense received a much-needed push forward from the Taepodong 
incident. It progressed even quicker after each of North Korea’s moves towards reviving its 
nuclear capabilities. As North Korea demonstrated its intentions, Japan naturally reacted. The 
first implication of this proposition is indeed observed: the 1998 Taepodong incident and North 
Korea’s restart of its nuclear program in 2002 raised threat perceptions in Japan. That heightened 
concern then led to greater interest and investment in missile defense. It might therefore be 
assumed that Japan’s interest in BMD early on started because of something either North Korea 
or China did. To outside observers, it should seem reasonable to suggest that Japan would pursue 
BMD in the early 1990s because it was already concerned about North Korea – particularly after 
the DPRK fired four short-range missiles into the Sea of Japan in 1993.  
 
Yet, not all focusing events had the effect that might have been expected. The 1993 North 
Korean launches and the 1996 Chinese military exercises did not change Japan’s threat 
perception of either country. Most of the policy planning being done on missile defense was an 
example of defense planning. It entailed looking fifteen to twenty years into the future to see 
what that future security environment might look like, and identifying the threats, challenges, 
and opportunities there. It was not contingency planning, which would have instead involved 
looking at the current security environment and developing plans to respond given the forces at 
hand.97 Experts had expected the threat to develop, with North Korea always on the periphery 
and China on the rise. When North Korea and China did finally act, it was surprising – and yet 
not totally outside Japan’s expectations of what might happen. 
 
Though it is true that certain focusing events entered into the calculus of Japan’s 
decision-making, they were not always necessary to the heightened threat perception that 
eventually led to missile defense. North Korea’s pre-1998 launches were not the “‘clear and 
present danger’ that required serious policy and acquisitions responses.”98 Rather, the danger that 
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missile defense was preparing for was a North Korea or China a decade down the line. Focusing 
events tended to instead reinforce notions about neighboring countries that Japan already held. 
 
As such, the Focusing Event Proposition is, for the most part, true. It would be foolish to 
suggest that Japan’s commitment to BMD was not in great part driven by the Taepodong 
incident or North Korea’s provocations in the 2000s. But to suggest that that was all that it was 
driven by – as some in the literature have done – is also misrepresentative of what happened. 
 
 
Table 5. Focusing Event Proposition Results 
 
Observable implications Narrative observed 
I1: Missile defense a reaction to escalation of threats, 
demonstrated by specific focusing events, by neighboring 
countries 
• Ex. Potential focusing events: a missile launch, a 
government-issued threat against Japan, termination of 
negotiations with Japan, movement of Navy ships into 
disputed territories, etc. 
• Escalation of threat perception evidenced by public 
statements of condemnation from Japanese government 
officials, reference to focusing event in next Defense White 
Paper 
I2 (uncertain): Neighboring countries actions’ that lower 
threat perception à  scaling back on missile defense 
• Ex. Actions: Treaty signing, positive negotiations, 
agreements to stop building particular offensive weaponry 
• I1 mostly true:  
• 1998 Taepodong incident 
• 2002 North Korea restart of nuclear 
program, withdrawal from NPT 
• More complicated: 
• Focusing events do not always lead to 
heightened or lowered threat perception 
• 1993 North Korea missile launches 
• 1996 China missile demonstrations 
 
 
Alliance Pressure Proposition 
 
Missile defense in Japan has never been considered independent of the United States. 
Everything that has resulted since the late 1980s has been the direct result of (at times) heavy-
handed pressure from US policymakers, dialogues with US defense establishment officials, and 
trade deals with US defense industry contractors. As the narrative illustrates, missile defense was 
presented in the early 1990s as one of the few means by which Japan might revive its security 
alliance with the United States. The “connectors” between the two countries were, at the time, 
considered too insubstantial. The United States’ armed forces, which had significantly closer ties 
to NATO and even South Korea, were not operationally aligned with Japan’s Self-Defense 
Forces. Due to the very nature of the bilateral command structure, there existed a US Command, 
with a US staff; a Japan Joint Staff Office with all Japanese staff; and a bilateral liaison between 
the two.99 With missile defense, there was “an opportunity for real joint development”100 that 
would bring the two countries into closer coordination efforts. 	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The first implication of this proposition is especially apparent in the mid- to late-1990s. If 
the United States was anything at that time, it was persistent – even in the years when it had no 
concrete program in mind. It continually brought unilaterally-researched proposals to the 
Japanese. It also pressed the issue as a way of alleviating the trade tensions of the early 1990s. 
But some were also more direct in their disappointment as BMD talks dragged on. Indeed, as 
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Carl Ford said in 1995 during a visit with a JDA official: 
“Relations with the US military industry and Congress will suffer if no progress is made in 
introducing the TMD.”101 
 
The narrative, however, proves the third implication false. A decrease in pressure from 
the US did not lead to Japan rolling back, or even slowing, its missile defense efforts. By the 
2000s, pressure from the United States was less overt – and, perhaps, less necessary – as missile 
defense took on a greater importance for those involved in Japan. It became something of “a 
poster-child for alliance cooperation at the height of the Bush-Koizumi years.”102 By then, US 
policy had taken more of a backseat in Japan’s decision-making. In fact, US Undersecretary of 
Defense Douglas Feith denied the existence of US pressure in 2002, saying, “We are not 
pressing Japan to do anything. It is not the way we deal with our allies.”103 Japan’s pursuit of 
BMD was more self-motivated, and more of its own position, as opposed to a policy being 
imposed on them from above by the United States. The Government of Japan – from Koizumi, 
who offered quieter support, to Ishiba, to the rest of the JDA and MOFA – was mostly already on 
board with BMD. As a result, progress accelerated. For the United States, negotiations became 
more akin to “pushing an open door.”104 
 
What Japan needed – and received – in the early 2000s was not the United States’ heavy 
hand, but its reassurances to Japan that it was actually committed to missile defense this time 
around. The Japanese were wary, having already once been asked by the Americans to join them 
in their missile defense program – only for the US to then quit on SDI. They needed to know that 
the United States was serious. But the US could not convince Japan as it continued to stand 
under the terms of the ABM Treaty; US-Russian negotiations might undo everything if it was 
decided that missile defense violated existing arms control regimes.105  In other words, the 
Japanese needed to know, in the words of former DOD official Sak Sakoda: “If we step up to 
this, will [the United States] be there tomorrow, next month, next year?” Thus, when President 
Bush announced that the United States would no longer comply with the ABM Treaty, it was a 
real show of commitment to its allies. It demonstrated that, if the Japanese would devote the 
political capital, the technical expertise, and the money to missile defense, the United States 
would be there with them: “[The United States] had to convince Japan, and Japan had to be 
convinced.”106 	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The Alliance Pressure Proposition might thus be considered only partially true. Pressure 
from the United States pushed Japan forward only to a certain extent. There is no denying that 
part of the reason why Japan entertained SDI was because it had serious fears over US 
disengagement in Japan. It was the alliance that brought Japan to the table, and it was the 
alliance that kept Japan at the table. The United States kept pushing – and it was because the US 
conducted its analyses unilaterally and shared them with the Japanese that the conceptual plans 
for collaboration were there at the right time, in the mid- to late- 1990s. 	  
But alliance pressure alone did not bring about Japan’s deployment of BMD. If it had, 
Japan might have committed to missile defense long before 2003 – or even 1999 – in those early 
years when it needed to prove to the United States that it still wanted the alliance to remain one 
of the United States’ top priorities. Japan, as with any ally, needed the United States’ 
reassurances – not only that investment in missile defense would pay off, but that the US would 
also be committed to Japan.  
 
 
Table 6. Alliance Pressure Proposition Results 
 
Observable implications Narrative observed 
I1: Progress towards missile defense follows 
increased pressure from US 
• Ex. US pressure: statements from US side 
emphasizing importance of missile defense to 
alliance (refusal of joint initiative would hurt 
security arrangement, joining would bring two 
countries closer together as allies), description of 
missile defense as measure of burden-sharing, 
proposals from US on ways to collaborate 
I2: Japanese acknowledgement of importance of 
missile defense to alliance 
I3 (uncertain): Decrease in pressure from US à  
scaling back in missile defense 
• Ex. Decrease in pressure: US focusing attentions 
elsewhere, discussions of US-Japan cooperation in 
other areas 
• I1 true:  
• Missile defense never considered 
independent of the US 
• 1995: “Relations with the US military 
industry and Congress will suffer if no 
progress is made in introducing the TMD.” 
• I2 true 
• I3 not true 
• Pressure largely unnecessary during early 
2000s: negotiations more akin to “pushing an 
open door” 
• Political establishment mostly on board 
 
Domestic Leadership Proposition 
 
The timing of Japan’s BMD deployment within the Koizumi administration might lead to 
yet another reasonable assumption, that Koizumi’s influence and support of missile defense 
drove the acceleration in progress. The narrative, however, shows that forward movement during 
the administration has largely been attributed to Shigeru Ishiba and the JDA. Of course, Koizumi 
must have given the JDA chief his tacit approval to make the statements that he did. But if BMD 
was anyone’s undertaking, it was Shigeru Ishiba’s.  
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Turning to another period of Japanese history nearly a decade earlier – to Murayama’s 
term in office starting in 1994 – even further illustrates the point that overt prime ministerial 
involvement in BMD has been minimal. As previously noted, Murayama and the Socialist Party 
of Japan opposed missile defense; but BMD talks continued unabated. As former OSD Senior 
Country Director for Japan and Senior Policy Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of State Robin 
“Sak” Sakoda notes about this period of time, the policy specialists could not and would not have 
done anything they were not allowed to do. Regardless of Murayama’s politics, he could not 
have changed the standing security framework for the alliance, which established a structure for 
bilateral negotiation, on a whim. Changing that structure would have required a shift in the entire 
security and defense framework. Thus, talks proceeded – even without Murayama’s help – 
between the US Department of Defense and the JDA. To a lesser extent, the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs eventually followed the JDA, despite seeing the issue as a potentially “sticky 
policy matter.”107 Within the Government of Japan, it was the JDA that could see missile 
proliferation in movement and that understood the operational requirements for missile 
defense.108 
 
As such, none of the observable implications expected from the proposition proved to be 
entirely true. BMD development remained on a steady upward trajectory throughout its history. 
There was no sudden downtick in progress following Murayama’s rise, nor any unexpected 
uptick following Koizumi’s. It certainly helped BMD to have political support at the Prime 
Ministerial level. It became easier to justify missile defense’s cost, its nature as a defensive 
mechanism, and its legality. But for the majority of Japan’s history with BMD, progress was 
driven by those at the policy level – at State/DOD and JDA/MOFA – who continued to work on 
missile defense, irrespective of changes on the political front. 
 
 
Table 7. Domestic Leadership Proposition Results 
 
Observable implications Narrative observed 
I1: Prime Minister supportive of missile defense 
à  progress on missile defense efforts 
• Ex. Prime Ministerial support: statements of 
interest in missile defense or remilitarization, 
characterization as nationalistic or more hawkish 
I2 (uncertain): Prime Minister ambivalent 
about missile defense à  pause on missile 
defense efforts, slowdown, lack of progress 
towards deployment 
I3 (uncertain): Prime Minister critical of missile 
defense à  rolling back previous efforts made, 
decrease in funds allocated to missile defense 
• I1 partially true:  
• Ex. Progress during Koizumi administration 
attributed mostly to Shigeru Ishiba 
• I2 not true 
• I3 not true 
• Ex. Tomiichi Murayama 
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Legal Restrictions Proposition 
 
According to the Legal Restrictions Proposition, Japan needed to overcome several 
hurdles in its interpretation of the Constitution before missile defense deployment. One of the 
implications of this proposition was that confusion over whether missile defense was allowed 
would have led to a lack of progress towards deployment. This was certainly true. As US 
representatives negotiating with Japan during the 1990s would attest, it cannot be overstated just 
how deeply the national, cultural proclivities against military involvement ran. As former Senior 
Country Director for Japan at the Pentagon Paul Giarra comments, constitutional limitations – 
engrained as they were in the Japanese security identity – were the “proverbial wet blanket” on 
missile defense talks.109 Japan’s opposition to missile defense was based on two significant legal 
roadblocks: the resolution against the militarization of space, and the ban on collective self-
defense. These issues made missile defense a politically sensitive topic. Policy negotiators did 
not know how far they could go without first resolving these questions. 
 
The other implication also proved to be true. Prior to the 2003 deployment, the 
government made numerous announcements explaining how missile defense would be legal. In 
doing so, it resolved several issues, including the matter of collective self-defense, as well as the 
defensive defense nature of BMD. The Koizumi statement of deployment in 2003 specifically 
addressed this issue when it called missile defense “the only and purely defensive measure, 
without alternatives, to protect…against ballistic missile attacks.”110 
 
Table 8. Legal Restrictions Proposition Results 
 
Observable implications Narrative observed 
I1: Shift in Japan’s official understanding of what 
Article 9 does or does not allow – explained in 
Defense White Paper, official government 
statements, National Defense Program Guidelines 
• Legal decisions to allow missile defense: definition 
of missile defense as strictly defensive, clarification 
of collective self-defense on whether to intercept 
missile directed at US, possible relaxation of ban on 
arms exports 
I2: Confusion over whether missile defense allowed 
à  lack of progress towards deployment 
  
• Shift going to be precipitated by another causal 
variable – possibly one of other three hypotheses 
(focusing event, Prime Minister, pressure from US) 
pushing JDA towards reinterpretation 
• I1 true:  
• Several hurdles in legal interpretation 
overcome before 2003 deployment 
(collective self-defensive, defensive defense 
nature of missile defense) 
• I2 true 
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Some other factors, however, must have spurred the changes in Japan’s reinterpretation 
of the Constitution. The other variables of interest in this analysis – focusing events, alliance 
pressure, and domestic leadership – are all probable causes. This, however, is a separate question 
beyond the scope of this analysis. 
 
Overall, two of the four propositions, Focusing Event and Legal Restrictions, proved to 
be true. Alliance Pressure was only partially true, while Domestic Leadership was false. 
 
Table 9. Results summary 
 
Proposition True/False 
P1: Focusing Event Proposition True 
P2: Alliance Pressure Proposition Partially true 
P3: Domestic Leadership Proposition False 
P4: Legal Restrictions Proposition True 
Technical Feasibility, Cost, and Defense Industry Emerge as Factors in Narrative 
 
Technical feasibility and cost of missile defense as interrelated deterrents 
 
Japanese policymakers often considered technical feasibility and cost together, in the 
sense that they did not want to invest in missile defense unless they knew it would work. Some, 
according to Paul Giarra, questioned whether missile defense was going to be technologically 
competitive enough to keep up with progress in offense weapons. Offense is simply much less 
expensive. In the long term, missile defense might not be able to keep up. But the basic idea of 
missile defense was tested during the Gulf War – and, as MHI’s Masato Nagase stated, “Even 
[though] the probability of engagement was low…once an incoming missile was actually shot 
down, the [idea of] missile defense proved realistic.” 
 
Tests in the late 1990s and early 2000s then demonstrated that missile defense could 
work. As Nagase continued, “The Japanese defense engineers and industrial leaders had never 
doubted about the [feasibility of] interception, although the media and some government officials 
claimed ‘bullet to hit bullet’ is impossible. The actual challenge has been how to improve the 
engagement probability.”111 The defense industry demonstrated that, with time, missile defense 
could be more accurate – that it really could intercept incoming missiles with some degree of 
certainty. The Koizumi administration specifically noted these developments in its 
announcement of BMD deployment, saying, “The technological feasibility of BMD system has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 See Nagase, Masato and Hiroshi Tajima. 
	   36	  
been verified through the results of interception tests…it is concluded that these systems with 
high technological reliability meets the high technical standards to enable the introduction.”112 
 
The costs of missile defense then became a matter of prioritizing BMD within the defense 
budget. Each fiscal year between 2004 and 2007, BMD acquisition costs exceeded 10% of all 
defense procurement expenses.113 Once Japanese policymakers were convinced that BMD was a 
worthwhile investment, they were willing to spend the billions necessary ($12 billion total by 
2012114) to attain the system. 
 
Defense industry profit incentive for pushing Japanese missile defense 
 
A significant factor that has largely gone without examination in the main literature on 
Japan’s history with missile defense is the role of the defense industry. The defense industry was 
the first Japanese stakeholder to push the idea of missile defense. Indeed, while research began in 
the industries in 1988, the government did not officially get involved until 1994. From the very 
inception of Japanese BMD, it was the Japanese and the American industries that initiated US-
Japan cooperation. It was not begun by direction from the Japanese government. The defense 
industry understood the potential profit that could result from a Japanese decision to deploy 
BMD. It was never a concern that constitutional limitations or technical feasibility would 
become a problem. Again, for those at MHI and in the rest of the Japanese industry who were 
there at the start, missile defense was a matter of when, not if. As Nagase and Tajima comment: 
Because [the] Theater Missile Defense system is solely defensive, we never thought that 
the Constitution might prohibit the TMD system (today’s BMD)…Therefore, the 
question for us old-timers was ‘when, how soon’ rather than ‘if’…At that time, we of 
course did not think it would take eighteen years (1985-2003)…[for the] Government of 
Japan to decide on BMD.” 115 
 
The importance of profiting from missile development is, in part, represented by the 
content of the MOU, which brought Japan in on joint research on the SM-3 BlockIIA missile. 
Japan in part chose this specific missile because the R&D process for the Block I model was 
already advanced enough in the United States that Japan’s industry would see little benefit to 
joining at the last moment.116 Additionally, one of Japan’s demands in negotiations over the 
MOU was “access – not only purchase but domestic production with substantial technology 
transfer – for the Block I missile.”117 There were thus more business-driven motives involved in 
the negotiations as well, advanced by not only the defense industry but also abetted by the 
Government of Japan. 
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Discussion 
 
This thesis demonstrates that Japan’s involvement with missile defense cannot be 
attributed merely to the “Taepodong shock” that followed the North Korean launch in 1998. It 
shows a complex combination of various factors coming into play during the 1990s and the early 
2000s, and their shifts in importance as the political landscape within and the security 
environment outside Japan changed in that time. 
 
This analysis identifies focusing events, alliance pressures, bureaucratic leadership, legal 
restrictions, technical feasibility and cost, and the defense industry as crucial factors in the 
history of Japanese missile defense. This does not, however, mean that no other variables 
mattered. In fact, alternative explanations, such as the Diet, the Prime Minister, and the public, 
still had and continue to have a role in this narrative. The bureaucrats within the JDA and 
MOFA, for example, are empowered by the Prime Minister; their influence comes primarily 
from the influence of the office granted to them. Similarly, Japan must have the Diet’s approval 
to proceed with an endeavor as significant as missile defense. The Diet is itself driven by public 
popularity. To ignore variables such as these would be to again oversimplify and mischaracterize 
what actually happened. 
 
The identified variables are also interrelated and difficult to empirically separate from 
one another. While clear from the historical analysis that they did indeed provide the main drive 
behind Japan’s BMD decisions, they were also more than likely intertwined. As the DOD and 
the State Department pressed Japan more heavily on missile defense, their bureaucratic 
counterparts at the JDA and MOFA largely wanted to oblige and therefore began the process of 
loosening legal restrictions on the issue. When the defense industry demonstrated to government 
officials that missile defense was not only possible, but also valuable, the GOJ was sure to 
include technology transfers from the US to Japan in its agreements. In such a complicated 
reality with tens of possible factors, it is simply more reasonable to assume that these causal 
variables interacted with one another. 
Conclusion 
 
As one of only two countries (the other being the United States) with both the lower- and 
upper-level capabilities for intercepting incoming missiles, Japan now has one of the most 
sophisticated missile defense systems in the entire world. Conventional wisdom and the existing 
literature consider this success along a historical trajectory that started the day of the 1998 North 
Korean Taepodong launch. But the narrative shows that the achievement of missile defense 
capability in Japan was in fact the result of an uphill struggle begun in the late 1980s. Though the 
Taepodong incident was indeed important, numerous other factors – including alliance pressures, 
bureaucrats, and the defense industry among them – also played a role in Japan’s decision to 
deploy BMD. 
 
Incorrectly folding Japan’s commitment to BMD in with “Taepodong shock” threatens to 
rewrite the actual history of the US-Japan alliance. This, in turn, generates unrealistic 
expectations of what Japan can and will do militarily together with the United States. The 
	   38	  
disconnect between Japan and the US has already taken its toll on the alliance. Relations between 
the partners in recent years have been described as “anything but warm” 118– in part, as this thesis 
shows, because Japan’s tendency to move at a frigid pace on security issues like missile defense 
has led to doubt on the US side about whether Japan will ever reach a satisfying point in holding 
its own within the alliance. If there is one commonality amongst those who negotiated with the 
Japanese on missile defense in the 1990s, it is their frustration with the sluggishness and the lack 
of coherence that characterized the Japanese side. Negotiations such as these color the United 
States’ perception of its alliance with Japan. Whereas every Japanese delegation was welcomed 
with open arms in the 20th century, it has become increasingly difficult to convince Washington 
of why Japan is very important. Its story has “diminished,” and expectations that Japan will step 
up have dwindled.119 
 
Neither Japan nor the United States can afford to hold such doubts about the alliance 
these days. Relations in East Asia have deteriorated in recent years, with a number of issues – the 
rise of China, territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas, the conflict between India 
and Pakistan, and North Korea’s irrational behavior – cropping up. Japan will need the assurance 
of the United States’ nuclear umbrella. As the United States transitions towards a greater 
emphasis on East Asia, it will need Japan to be – as former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro 
Nakasone put it in the 1980s – its “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in the Pacific. It will need Japan to 
take on a leadership role in East Asia. The United States can only do this if it enters the bargain 
with a full understanding of how far Japan will go. Such an understanding only comes with 
knowing the history of the US-Japan alliance. 
 
Taken as a whole, the historical narrative holds significant lessons for what the United 
States can reasonably ask of Japan within the alliance. Although the Taepodong launch was a 
significant event in this history, even a missile flying over the islands was not reason enough for 
Japan to pursue BMD. What Japan needed was not only downward pressure from the United 
States, but also reassurance from its longest-standing ally that it was truly committed to the 
security of Japan. It had to first agree with the security assessment that there were neighboring 
countries to worry about, and to then find ways around its legal complications. The US’ strongest 
allies in this were the bureaucrats and the defense industry, who were able to demonstrate to the 
rest that, because missile defense was technologically feasible, it was worth the cost of 
investment. In order to convince its ally to join in its initiatives, the United States must do more 
than simply expect of Japan when it has little more than words and unformed ideas to offer. 
 
The results here also tie into a deeper body of theoretical literature that could drive 
further research into Japan’s security strategy. As previously noted, work on defensive and 
offensive dominance led to the correct intuition that Japan needed to clarify its legal restrictions 
before pursuing missile defense. So what led to these reinterpretations? And where does Japan 
draw the line between offensive and defensive weaponry? These are but two of the many 
questions about Japan that still need examination, and they become more important with every 	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passing year. US policymakers must continue to ask questions that go to the heart of how and 
why Japan makes national security decisions. Otherwise, they risk jeopardizing an alliance that 
has served as the cornerstone of security in East Asia for over 50 years. 
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